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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In 2010, the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile established joint operational military structures as 
part of a more general reform of national security and 
defense institutions.  While it is too soon to assess the impact 
of these institutional innovations, we can benefit from a 
quick overview of some of the main points of the successful 
U.S. effort at “jointness”1 in the Goldwater – Nichols 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N). Based on the 
experience of the U.S., the author is not sanguine that the 
formal move of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to joint 
structures will soon result in an improvement in their joint 
military behavior.  The U.S. Government and the United 
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in particular, 
can increase the chances of these joint structures becoming 
effective by orienting attention and resources to them and to 
the ministries of defense (MOD), which has inspired them, 
and not to the individual services. While Colombia has not 
mandated joint structures at the national level, it has 
established joint regional commands that most observers 
believe have proven effective in fighting the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionaries de Colombia (FARC).  
USSOUTHCOM can continue to support these regional joint 
commands, while also seeking to influence reform at the 
national level of the MOD and a strengthening of the joint 
staff.  In this paper the author looks at the new joint 
structures in the three Southern Cone countries and to the 
regional commands in Colombia. 
                                                 
1 Here “jointness” means the different U.S. armed forces being able to 
operate together. It became possible, in my view, because of the 
requirement for officers from the different services to be educated jointly 
and in joint matters, and also service in joint billets. 
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PRIOR (TO 2010) MILITARY STRUCTURES AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
Prior to the 2010 reforms, the military structures of 
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, at the national level, did not 
allocate much power to the Minister of Defense (MOD).  
There was also very little “jointness”, and much overlapping 
and redundancy in responsibilities.  Figures 1-4 represent the 
past command structures of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and 
the current command structure of Colombia.    
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Figure 1:  Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure 
for Argentina 
Source:  “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and 
Caribbean”, (RESDAL, 2010) 
      
Figure 2: Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure for 
Brazil 
Source:  “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and 
Caribbean,”( RESDAL, 2010) 
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Figure 3: Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure for 
Chile 
Source:  “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and 
Caribbean,” (RESDAL, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 4: Current Legal Framework and Defense Structure 
for Colombia 
 
Source:  “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and 
Caribbean,” (RESDAL, 2010) 
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There are three important similarities in the three Southern 
Cone countries (Argentina, Chile and Brazil).  First, it took a 
very long time for the reforms to be passed into law from the 
beginning of the transitions. In Argentina, the transition 
began in 1983; in Brazil, in 1985; and Chile, in1990.  
Second, the laws that were finally passed, were part of a 
more comprehensive reform seeking to strengthen the 
MODs, and thus created the joint structures.  And third, 
either directly, through explicit pressure, or indirectly 
through exposure in U.S. programs in-country or in the U.S., 
the reforms in terms of joint structures were inspired by the 
U.S. experience with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (GN). Although not officially 
documented, there may possibly be links to the three 
countries have peacekeeping forces in Haiti, motivating 
international interoperability and compatibility as a factor for 
jointness.  
 
In Argentina, although the Law on National Defense had 
been passed in 1988, it was never implemented.  President 
Nestor Kirchner (2003 – 2007) saw to its implementation in 
June of 2006 in Law 727/ 2006.  This law strengthened the 
civilian – led ministry of defense, established the powers of 
the joint staff and took power away from the chiefs of the 
services.   
 
In the strengthened MOD itself, there are major accretions in 
the responsibilities in several critical areas of the 
organization.  These tend to follow closely to those 
suggested by Bruneau & Goetze in their work on roles and 
functions of ministries of defense.  (Bruneau & Tollefson, 
2006). In Law 727/2006, the armed forces‟ mission is limited 
to external defense and specifically against state actors. Also 
directivas (1691/ 2006; & 1714/2009) following on Law 
727/2006, circumscribed the roles and missions of the armed 
forces. The distinction is made between defense, which is the 
responsibility of the armed forces, and security, which is the 
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responsibility of the Secretariat for Domestic Security that is 
under the Ministry of Interior.  (It should be noted there is a 
new, cabinet-level, ministry dealing with internal security the 
ex-MOD.  Nilda Garre, now heads that ministry.)  
Consequently, the Armed Forces cannot deal with the so-
called new threats including terrorism, counter- drugs, and 
organized crime; what the Armed Forces can do is external 
peace-keeping missions.   This is believed to be a positive 
area in the overall fairly bleak panorama of the Argentine 
Armed Forces.   
 
While the laws were passed in 2006, implementing the law 
of 1988, it was only in December of 2010 that a Commander 
of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces was appointed; and, in 
Resolution 1633/2010, the structures of the joint staff 
specified. Appendix I presents the Boletín Oficial (Official 
Gazette) concerning these developments.  In short, there is 
now a joint staff in Argentina, but with the very limited roles 
and budget (less than 1% of GDP), of the Armed Forces.  
However, there is a real question regarding the significance 
of this structural change.  
 
In Brazil, Lei Complementar No 136 of 25 August 2010 
elaborated on the roles of the MOD and created the Estado-
Maior Conjunto das Forcas Armadas.  It must be noted that 
the MOD was created only in 1999.  Until then, there were 
six general or flag officers in the cabinet.  Figures 5 and 6 
present the Brazilian defense structures before and after the 
law No 136. All observers agree that Nelson Jobim (July 
2007 – present) is the first powerful MOD, and he was able 
to have a package of laws passed by the Congress in 2010, 
arguing that these issues were all internal to the MOD.  
Appendix II presents an overview of these laws. There were 
four components to the laws, which provided for an overall 
updating of roles, missions, and structures. The main 
question now is whether the joint structure will work since, 
as can be seen in Figure 6, all of the officers at the top levels 
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are four -star, and their positions mirrors to some degree the 
continuing structure of the three services.  
 
In Chile, although there has been a MOD since 1932, it 
began to change significantly with the democratic transition 
in 1990. There was, however, no law on its functioning until 
2010. (See Appendix III for the law.)  The Law led to the 
creation of a series of new structures within the MOD.  
Figures 7 and 8 present the Chilean defense structure before 
and after the transition in 2010. First, a single Undersecretary 
of Defense was created by combining the already existing, 
yet redundant, three departments of the armed forces [for 
War (or Army), Navy, and Air Forces], which were focused 
on rather administrative duties for each institution.  Second, 
a Joint Chiefs of Staff was created, which had an operational 
function related to the joint preparation and utilization of the 
Armed Forces. It also commands and conducts operations at 
the strategic level (including international crises 
management operations, and external wars). Third, a new 
Undersecretary for Defense Policy Office was created 
(which was supposed to be staffed with civilian subject 
matter experts) to develop defense and military policy and 
conduct the main defense planning (e.g. war plans, joint 
planning).  
 
In both of these reforms, the competencies of the ministers of 
defense were increased; and new structures to promote 
“jointness” in the Armed Forces created, as can be seen from 
the more detailed before and after descriptions for first Brazil 
and then Chile.   
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Figure 5: Brazil Defense Structure before the Law of 25 August 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Brazil detailed defense Structure after the Decree Law of 
25 August 2010 (above). 
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Figure 7: Detailed Chilean Defense Structure before the Law of 2010 
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Figure 8: Detailed Chilean Defense Structure after the Law of 2010 
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It must be understood that the trend, (in at least these three 
countries of Argentina, Chile and Brazil), towards joint 
military command structures is part of a reform in civil–
military relations. This is in terms of not only consolidating 
democratic civilian control but also in increasing military 
effectiveness.  In all three countries, the apparent changes 
towards more joint structures are part and parcel of a reform 
in which the powers of the minister of defense are 
specifically increased.  The question remains, however, 
whether there are sufficient civilians, with stability in their 
positions and expertise, to be able to implement these new 
structures, and to force independent services to cooperate 
and operate jointly. 
 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF MORE JOINTNESS: LESSONS 
FROM GOLDWATER – NICHOLS (G-N) 
 
There is a double relevance for analyzing the current Latin 
American efforts at establishing new joint command 
structures of the U.S. experience at achieving “jointness”.  
First, as noted at the beginning of this report, either 
explicitly, through pressures on civilian officials and military 
officers in the region, or implicitly though readings and 
courses attended by these same officials and officers, U.S. 
officials and officers have emphasized the importance of 
“jointness”.  Second, a real (versus shallow) understanding 
of the U.S. experience can allow us to better evaluate the 
likelihood of these new, formal structures taking on meaning 
and content.  
 
As stated in the Introduction to “Beyond Goldwater - 
Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era” states 
(CSIS Report, March 2004, p. 12): 
 
“In the mid-1980s, a series of operational military failures in 
the field – the botched attempt to rescue the American 
hostages in Iran, the Beirut embassy bombing and the 
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interoperability problems during the invasion of Grenada – 
convinced Congress that the Department of Defense was 
broken and that something had to be done. Despite intense 
resistance from DoD, over four years of Congressional 
hearings, investigation, and analysis finally culminated in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) – a landmark of U.S. 
defense reform.” 
 
There are four points that should be emphasized regarding 
G-N and its relevance for “jointness” in these three 
countries. (See the references to Barrett, Locher, and Roman 
& Tarr). First, there had long been a deep awareness in the 
U.S. of the institutional impediments to the combat 
effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces.  It required, 
however, several operational failures to galvanize support for 
the major reforms embodied in G-N.  Second, the success of 
G-N, that was the last major reform of U.S. national security 
and defense (although there have been 21 largely 
unsuccessful efforts between 1986 and 2008) was a 
bipartisan effort.  Third, as the U.S. executive (mainly the 
Department of Defense) would not take the initiative in 
institutional reform, it was the U.S. Congress that finally 
took the initiative and passed the reform, over the opposition 
of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy 
Lehman, and virtually all of the uniformed heads of the 
services. While there were many reasons for resistance to the 
changes included in G-N, the main opposition was due to 
perceived loss of autonomy for the services, and for 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the perception that the 
reforms were a criticism of his stewardship of DoD.  And, 
fourth, G-N is based on incentives; if an officer aspires to 
become an O-7, he or she must do JPME and serve in joint 
billets. The authors of the G-N law specifically based their 
strategy for its implementation in the services on incentives.  
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In Argentina, Brazil and Chile none of these key drivers for 
reform, resulting in “jointness” in the U.S., apply.  First, in 
virtually all of the reforms, which focus first on the MOD 
and then on the joint staff, the emphasis is on asserting 
civilian control and not achieving effectiveness.  Here 
effectiveness means the ability for the forces to in fact 
implement the roles and missions they are entrusted with. 
Second, as none of the armed forces in these three countries 
are engaged in combat, there can be none of the catalytic 
effects arising from operational disasters which 
demonstrated again and again in the former U.S. system.  
Third, none of the Latin American congresses have anything 
like the power and sense of power that the U.S. Congress 
embodies and exercises.  If the model of reform in Latin 
America, as in the U.S. is G-N, then it appears very unlikely 
that “jointness” will catch on.  And fourth, none of the 
MODs or joint staffs in South America gives any indication 
of the use of incentives, or disincentives, to promote the 
support of officers of joint structures and processes.   
 
In Colombia, it is interesting to note that Figure 9 (also 
included in Appendix IV) does not even include the MOD in 
the Command Structure.    Despite U.S. efforts in the early 
period of the presidency of Alvaro Uribe (2002 – 2010), 
there was minimal reform of the MOD.  As the then Minister 
Marta Lucia Ramirez remarked, “There is a civilian minister 
of defense but not a civilian ministry of defense.”  The 
phenomenon of joint commands is separate, unlike 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, from MOD reform. The 
stimulus for “jointness” arises from the need to fight the 
FARC, and other illegal armed groups.  
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Figure 9: Detailed Current Command Structure of Colombia at the 
Level of the Armed Forces 
 
In the late 1990's to early 2000's, the establishment of area 
joint commands started (Joint Task Force South and Joint 
Task Force Caribbean).  These early attempts lacked real 
control over units.  The next iteration was to transform Joint 
Task Force South to the now Task Force Omega.  The 
difference was that Task Force Omega had units 
permanently assigned to it from most of the forces.  They 
were given the authority and the resources for mobility to 
move anywhere tactically needed.  This reorganization 
proved very successful because the military was no longer 
constrained by operational area boards, which the FARC 
took advantage of to escape pursuing military units.  The 
combination of service capabilities into one planning group 
also facilitated intelligence, logistical and combat support 
efforts. (See Porch, 2111). 
 
Based on the success of Task Force Omega several other JTF 
were created.  The largest of which is Joint Task Force 
Pacific 2009, to fight the FARC in the Pacific region.  In 
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2010, Gen. Freddy Padilla de Leon, Commander of the 
Colombian Armed Forces, wanted to have a seminar with 
general officers from all of the services to discuss the 
success of Joint Commands in their effort against the FARC 
and other illegal armed groups.  All of the current, and some 
of the former, JTF Commanders were present with the 
services‟ Vice-Chiefs (later to become the current leaders). 
The U.S. expectation for this conference was that the idea of 
“jointness” showed benefits and utility for the war against 
the illegal armed groups, and that the recommendation would 
be to continue. Several comments in the open forum from the 
general officers present were that there is no doubt that 
“jointness” has helped; but how to replicate (quickly) the 
success in the rest of the territory.  They further suggested 
that there was no room for service specific military districts, 
as the Army is divided today.  The ideas were that the entire 
country should be divided into Joint Commands (COCOMS) 
in which all military assets would belong to one 
Commander. This would obviously facilitate combined 
operations, and it would also focus all coordinated operations 
with the Police. (At the time this report is being written no 
published report on the seminar is available. See Estructura 
Seminario presented in Appendix IV). 
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